US in Mesopotamia: Should They Stay Or Should They Go?

In the fifth year of American occupation of Iraq, as more voices join the "worst-decision-ever" crowd, it is now clear that most Americans and Iraqis want US troops out of Iraq. Yet supporters of the war will not cease to pull new arguments and justifications out of their bottomless bag of stubbornness.

Conservatives do not frame the debate anymore around the benefits of victory -a democratic, stable, friendly beacon of hope in the Middle East- but around the dire consequences of defeat. The same pundits that were tragically wrong in all of their earlier predictions, affirm with unfailing confidence that they know what will happen upon premature withdrawal of US troops: a bloodbath, possibly escalating into a regional war involving Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the other usual suspects; a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda in the Sunni regions of Iraq; and a hit to US reputation added to a strategic gift for Iran, which will happily ride the wave of the Shiite crescent on the back of a Shiite government in Baghdad.

Less mentioned is the argument that, although the overwhelming majority of Iraqis would like US troops to leave, the government of Iraq -including President Talabani and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki- hope to prolong US commitment as long as they need to stabilize the country and consolidate their authority. However, just a few days ago, Maliki surprised most observers by declaring that US troops could leave whenever they wanted, because the Iraqi army was ready to take over security and pacify the country. They aren't, and Maliki knows it, but this candid statement reflects an important strategic shift: the largely Shiite government of Iraq has realized that the United States' new course is detrimental to their interests.

The much-discussed and never-met political benchmarks dictate a greater share of power and wealth for the Sunni minority of Iraq. The Administration and Congress are pushing for new provincial elections -boycotted by the Sunnis in 2005- to give the Sunnis greater representation in the north. This overlooks the fact that elections would take place in the south as well, giving Moqtada al-Sadr greater prominence, especially in Baghdad, and weakening the leading Shiite bloc in parliament, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council. But most importantly, the United States is resorting to arming militias of Sunni insurgents to take on Al-Qaeda. These Sunni insurgents have been battling against the Shiite government of Iraq and do not plan to stop. Even though American troops are being killed mostly by Sunni radicals, the US has chosen to side with the Sunnis against the Shiites. A similar pattern can be seen in Lebanon -where the Administration doesn't shy away from approaching militias of Sunni fundamentalists so that they can fight against Hezbollah- and the larger Middle East, where the United States staunchly supports Saudi interests against Syria and Iran. This Faustian bargain has eerie and striking similarities with the events that precipitated the origins of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

If this is the path taken, it is likely that Nuri al-Maliki and other prominent Shiite politicians of SIIC and Dawa will join al-Sadr in his opposition to US policy. If we were to ignore the wishes of most Americans, most Iraqis, and the legitimate government of Iraq, that leaves us with the three arguments aforementioned. I cannot comment on the bloodbath argument. Will it be worse than it is now? For how long? Unlike most people, I do not have a crystal ball. A sanctuary for Al-Qaeda in Iraq is the most used but weakest argument. Foreign fighters in Iraq are few, loathed by most Sunnis, and cannot dream to topple a government supported by the largest population bloc in the country -Shiites outnumber Sunnis by three to one- and protected by Iran. Al-Qaeda is a problem, and a growing one, in the neglected front: Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Finally, the reputation argument is spelled roughly as follows: if the United States gives in to terrorists, or withdraws without getting the job done and admits defeat, the consequences would range from diplomatic embarrassment to a diminished ability to wield power in world affairs. But admitting defeat and leaving has not been catastrophic for great powers. Algeria was far more important for France, and De Gaulle's decision to let it go is considered among the wisest in French statesmanship. Leaving Saigon in 1975 did not prove to be a strategic disaster for the United States: the dominoes didn't fall in Southeast Asia, and it was the USSR that lost the Cold War after getting involved in their own Afghan quagmire. Reagan pulled out the American troops from Lebanon after Hezbollah's bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, and in 2003 Bush redeployed the US military bases in Saudi Arabia -the original reason behind Bin Laden's declaration of war against the West. Nixon, Reagan, Bush... the Democrats should take lessons from the Republicans on how to be soft on communism and terrorism.